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ACCESS DENIED—USING PROCEDURE TO RESTRICT TORT 
LITIGATION: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN EXPERIENCE
GILAT J. BACHAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2008, as a Palestinian mother and six of her children were 
having breakfast in their Beit-Hannoun home in the Gaza Strip, a missile 
fired from an Israeli aircraft killed the mother and four of the children, and 
injured the remaining two. After the military decided against investigating 
the incident,1 surviving members of the Abu Me’tiq family filed a civil 
action in an Israeli court alleging the commission of various torts by the 
State of Israel.2 Upon a motion made by the State, the plaintiffs were or-
dered to provide a bond in the amount of 12,000 NIS (approximately 
$3000) as a pre-condition for the litigation.3 In its opinion, the court con-
sidered the lawsuit’s slim chances and the State’s potential difficulty in 
enforcing a judgment that levies litigation expenses on the plaintiffs, but it 
did not consider the plaintiffs’ limited financial ability.4 The case was dis-
missed without ever reaching the merits.5
Procedural restrictions that limit individuals’ ability to bring law-
suits—like conditioning litigation upon the provision of a bond—are a 
* J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School; Fellow, Stanford Center for International Conflict and Nego-
tiation (SCICN); Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. I wish to thank Nora Freeman Engstrom, Deborah 
Hensler, Robert MacCoun, Jason Solomon, Bernadette Atuahene, Sandy Kedar, Itay Ravid, Renana 
Keydar, and the participants of the IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law Symposium on Dignity Takings 
and Dignity Restoration and the J.S.D. Colloquium at Stanford Law School. Valuable support for this 
research was provided by the Richard S. Goldsmith Grant for Research in Conflict Resolution and the 
Taube Center for Jewish Studies. This Article is Winner, Goldsmith Writing Prize for Best Paper in 
Dispute Resolution (2017).
1. See Press Release, B’Tselem, B’Tselem Demands a Criminal Investigation into the Killing of 
Five Members of the Abu Me’tiq family in Gaza (Apr. 30, 2008),
http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20080430 [https://perma.cc/CZ2Y-ZHYD]. 
2. CC (Magistrate Court, Herzlia) 16517-04-10 State of Israel v. Abu Me’tiq (unpublished, 
Oct.18, 2011) (Isr.).
3. Id.
4. In Israel, the loser pays the litigation expenses of the successful party. If the trial court doubts 
the plaintiff’s ability to pay the defendant’s expenses should the latter prevail, then, under Rule 519 of 
the Civil Law Procedure Regulations, the court can order the plaintiff to provide a security bond guar-
anteeing the payment. Civil Law Procedure Regulations, 5744–1984, Rule 519 (2014) (Isr.). On Pales-
tinians’ low standard of living, see infra note 59.
5. CC (BS) 16517-04-10 The State of Israel v. Abu Me’tiq (2012) (Isr.).
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subtle way to reduce the volume of civil litigation, particularly because of 
their ostensibly neutral facade.6 The use of such procedural doctrines, espe-
cially those that already exist on the books, allows legislatures to avoid 
debating the substance and appropriate scope of legal rights.7 This Article 
explores this phenomenon through the uncharted context of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (“the Conflict”). On the books, a unique procedural 
mechanism enables non-Israeli citizen Palestinians of the West Bank and, 
until recently, Gaza,8 to bring civil actions for damages against Israel in 
Israeli civil courts for injuries sustained because of Israel’s security forces’ 
actions in these areas (“the Claims”). Yet, since the early 2000s, Israel has 
used a host of procedural obstacles to restrict Palestinians’ access to its 
civil courts, effectively precluding their ability to bring Claims.
This account is based on fifty-five in-depth, semi-structured inter-
views9 I conducted with plaintiffs’ lawyers, government lawyers and other 
key stakeholders10 involved in the Claims.11 I also rely on statutes, bills, 
parliamentary protocols, case law, reports by human rights organizations, 
and responses to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) queries.12
6. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J.
1657, 1698–1700 (2016); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1861–67 (2014) (describing developments such as greater tenden-
cy to grant summary judgments, greater emphasis on settlement over litigation, and difficulty to bring 
cases to trial); SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
RETRENCHMENT 1–8 (2015) (explaining the turn against the courts in the U.S.); Stephen B. Burbank & 
Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1587–99 (2014) 
(demonstrating procedural reforms emanating from the Supreme Court in recent decades).
7. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1265–66 (2005). 
8. I refer to non-Israeli citizen Palestinians, who reside in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as 
opposed to Israel’s Arab citizens who are a minority group residing within Israel. Foreign nationals 
(like Rachel Corrie mentioned below) are also entitled to bring Claims, but since these are the excep-
tion, and for brevity, I refer to plaintiffs hereinafter as Palestinians.
9. When interviewees consented, I recorded and transcribed the interviews. When they did not, I 
sent them my notes, which several interviewees reviewed and modified.
10. These include plaintiffs, retired judges and representatives of human rights NGOs.
11. Interviews were conducted during four trips to Israel between June 2014 and July 2016, and 
in phone or Skype calls during periods spent at Stanford. Interview transcripts were originally in He-
brew (or rarely in English) and were analyzed using the mixed methods application “Dedoose.” Inter-
views with lawyers were anonymized. Government lawyers (“GL”) include three sub-groups: lawyers 
from the Tel-Aviv District Attorney’s Office (“DA”) who represent the State in court; lawyers from the 
Israeli Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) involved in policy making regarding the Claims; and lawyers from 
the legal department at the Israeli Ministry of Defense (“MOD”), the defendant in the Claims. Plaintiffs 
are represented by private lawyers (“PL”) or human rights NGO lawyers (“NGOL”) licensed to practice 
in Israel.
12. I use a top-down—rather than a bottom-up—approach, examining the intentions of those 
responsible for the restrictions. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creat-
ing a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies 
Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 812 (2016).
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Based on these data, I argue first that the use of procedure to encroach 
on an injured person’s right to compensation can be considered a taking of 
property.13 However, I also contend that such an analysis fails to fully cap-
ture the harm caused to these individuals. Exploring this deprivation 
through the role that civil litigation plays on the individual level reveals 
that procedural restrictions blocking access to the courts also deny Palestin-
ians of their right to participate in the process of civil litigation.14 I thus 
suggest that by focusing solely on a property-oriented analysis, a key com-
ponent of the harm—relating to the right to the litigation process—is over-
looked.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on 
Palestinians’ civil litigation against the Israeli government to lay out the 
context for the case study. Part II explains the procedural barriers restrict-
ing Palestinians’ access to Israel’s civil courts. Part III then uses two alter-
native lenses—property and process—to evaluate the specific harm 
resulting from these restrictions.
II. BACKGROUND—PALESTINIANS’ CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST 
ISRAEL
The complex reality of the Conflict creates frequent confrontations be-
tween Israel’s security forces, particularly the Israeli military (“IDF”),15 on
the one hand, and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza (the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, or “the Territories”) on the other hand.16
These encounters, at times, lead to property damage, personal injury, and 
the death of Palestinian civilians, at least some of whom were not involved 
in any hostilities. Events range from accidental explosions of land mines, to 
the use of riot control techniques during protests, drone attacks, and large-
13. As conceptualized through Atuahene’s dignity taking framework. Id. at 813–16; see also
Bernadette Atuahene, The Importance of Conversation in Transitional Justice: A Study of Land Restitu-
tion in South Africa, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 902, 909–10 (2014); BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE
WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 23–34 (2014);
Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involun-
tary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
14. See discussion infra Section III.C.
15. Israel’s security forces include IDF, police forces (typically Border Police Unit (“BPU”)), and 
the General Security Service. Ministry of Defense data cited below refer only to IDF incidents (includ-
ing BPU), while the other authorities do not maintain independent records regarding the Claims.
16. Importantly, Israel has a very different relationship with the West Bank and Gaza. While in 
the former Israel still controls both civil life and security to various degrees, in the latter, since 2005, 
Israeli involvement has significantly diminished. See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2d ed. 2012).
844 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:3
scale military operations.17 These events prompt the politically-charged 
question of whether Israel should be held civilly liable for injuries sus-
tained by Palestinian civilians due to IDF activities in the Territories. While 
Israeli tort law answers this question in the affirmative, the evolution of the 
legal regime as explained below provides a different answer.
Since the beginning of Israel’s occupation, Palestinians have been al-
lowed to petition Israel’s courts to challenge actions of the military re-
gime.18 As such, the Israeli case presents a rare exception to typical bars on 
bringing claims against the injuring state in armed conflicts.19 This excep-
tion stems from the special status of the Territories as occupied20 and the 
lack of alternative recourse for Palestinians in their home forum.21 As for 
suing the State, according to the Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law 
(“the Act”), Israel is not immune from civil liability. However, the State is 
not liable for an act performed through “Combat Action,”22 a term which 
has been significantly expanded over the years.23
There are two main, albeit limited, alternatives to the mechanism set 
forth by the Act.24 First, claimants can submit an application to an ex-gratia
committee, which has discretion to award small amounts of compensation 
17. One example is Operation Cast Lead, also known as the Gaza War: a three-week armed 
conflict between Gaza Palestinians and Israel during 2008–2009.
18. As part of this policy, bars of jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing do not apply to the 
Claims. See generally Michael Karayanni, Choice of Law under Occupation: How Israeli Law Came to 
Serve Palestinian Plaintiffs, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 1 (2009). For a discussion on the history of this policy, 
see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 19–25 (2002).
19. Yaël Ronen, Avoid or Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflections 
During Armed Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 181, 217 (2009) (noting that an individual lawsuit 
mechanism, like Israel’s, is rare in armed conflict settings). This mechanism differs, for example, from 
the U.S. military system, which uses military commissions and nominal “condolence payments.” See
John F. Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1455, 1463 (2007). 
20. According to international law, Israeli control in the Territories is defined as a “military 
occupation” and treated as temporary until a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will allow a 
withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces. Consequently, Israeli activity in the Territories is constantly criti-
cized by the international community. For more on the Territories’ status, see generally BENVENISTI,
supra note 16.
21. Palestinians are barred from bringing claims against Israel before Palestinian courts. See
MICHAEL KARAYANNI, CONFLICTS IN A CONFLICT 239 (2014) (discussing Palestinians’ lack of access 
to justice, which stems among other things from this restriction).
22. Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law, 5712–1952, § 2, 5 (as amended) (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Act], https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/features/compensation/law-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T5WD-3U5D]
23. Gilat J. Bachar, The Occupation of the Law: Judiciary-Legislature Power Dynamics in Pales-
tinians’ Tort Claims against Israel, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 577 (2017). 
24. These apply to Palestinian victims of IDF actions. By comparison, when it comes to Israeli
victims of terrorism, the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730–1970, 24 LSI 131 (1969–70) 
(Isr.), provides compensation for bodily injuries suffered in terrorist attacks and to family members of 
deceased victims, and the Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law, 5721–1961, 15 LSI 101 (1960–
61) (as amended) (Isr.) provides compensation for terrorism-caused property damage.
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to victims of IDF activity based on either independent requests or a court’s 
recommendation. The cases under the committee’s mandate are “irregular 
and unique humanitarian instances” in which the State was not liable under 
the law.25 Second, a Claims Headquarters Officer (“Kamat Tov’anot”) at 
the Israeli Ministry of Defense (“MOD”) also has the authority to compen-
sate Palestinian claimants due to damage caused by military actions.26 But
per MOD officials, this function is rarely used.27
Given the limited scope of these alternatives, civil courts remain the 
main path for Palestinians seeking compensation. Alongside the civil pro-
ceeding, IDF sometimes opens a criminal investigation when a suspicion 
arises of soldier misconduct. Since such investigations rarely result in an 
indictment,28 the civil proceeding is often used as an alternative course of 
action to the dead-end criminal liability path.29 The litigation process has 
several key characteristics. Claims represent individual cases—rather than 
a class action—and are based on injuries resulting from differing circum-
stances. Cases are first litigated in magistrate or district courts, depending 
on plaintiffs’ estimates of their damages.30 Only a small fraction make it to 
the Supreme Court on appeal,31 and even those cases are rarely covered by 
25. Working Procedure and Guidelines for the Committee Acting Under the MOD Concerning 
Ex-Gratia Payments (2011) (Isr.) (on file with author). Per MOD data, between 2004 and 2014, the 
total amount awarded by the Committee was 575,895NIS (approximately $156,000), in 42 cases (20 
cases were dismissed). Data are unavailable prior to 2004. Reports in Response to MOD FOIA Query 
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://bit.ly/2a982nf [https://perma.cc/BP7B-SJFH] (in Hebrew); Reports in Response 
to MOD FOIA Query (Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter FOIA Reports].
26. This authority is based on the Order Concerning Claims (Judea and Samaria) (No. 271) 1968 
(Isr.). See Claims and Appeals by Force of the Claims Order, IDF MAG FORCE,
http://www.law.idf.il/602-6942-en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/ASN5-XYDE].
27. Confidential Interview with GL7 (MOD) (Jan. 3, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with GL8 
(MOD) (Dec. 13, 2015).*
28. See Alleged Investigation: The Failure of Investigations into Offenses Committed by IDF 
Soldiers Against Palestinians, YESH DIN (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.yesh-din.org/en/alleged-
investigation-the-failure-of-investigations-into-offenses-committed-by-idf-soldiers-against-palestinians/
[https://perma.cc/4FSN-ZDTL]; see also Exceptions: Trying IDF Soldiers Since the Second Intifada 
and After, 2000–2007, YESH DIN (Dec. 25, 2008), http://www.yesh-din.org/en/exceptions-trying-idf-
soldiers-since-the-second-intifada-and-after-2000-2007/ [https://perma.cc/6FBY-KLY7].
29. Confidential Interview with NGOL2 (Aug. 12, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL1 (July 
14, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL3 (July 28, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with KS3 (Mar. 
10, 2016).* For instance, in the case of Estate of Aramin v. Ministry of Defense, while the criminal 
investigation against soldiers involved was closed due to lack of evidence, in the civil case the claim-
ants successfully recovered. CC (Jer) 9334/07 Estate of Aramin v. Ministry of Defense (2010) (Isr.).
30. The current threshold for bringing a case before the district courts is 2,500,000NIS (approxi-
mately $600,000). See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744–1984, § 51(a)(2), 38 LSI 271 (1983–
84) (Isr.).
31. Decisions in cases that were first litigated in magistrate courts are appealed before the district 
court. The Supreme Court considers cases on appeal from district courts. The Supreme Court rarely 
grants a right to appeal, for the second time, a magistrate court decision. See id. § 40(3); Basic Law: 
The Judiciary, 5748–1984, § 15, SH No. II 10 p. 78 (Isr.), 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawTheJudiciary.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT94-RMCZ]. 
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the media.32 Finally, prior to the Second Intifada, a violent Palestinian-
Israeli confrontation that started in September 2000, most successful 
Claims ended with a settlement.33 The tendency to settle during those years 
relates to the evidentiary challenges that both plaintiffs and the State face in 
the Claims.34 On the plaintiffs’ side, Palestinians typically do not maintain 
records of their property, particularly when it comes to individual farmers 
and shepherds, which in turn makes property damage caused by Israeli 
soldiers difficult to prove.35 On the State’s side, soldiers released from duty 
are often difficult to reach, do not remember the specifics of a chaotic sit-
uation,36 or are reluctant to take part in the trial.37 Moreover, in previous 
years, the IDF did not always maintain records of its use of force inci-
dents.38 These challenges thus encouraged settlements in the pre-Second 
Intifada era.
Yet, beginning in the Second Intifada,39 the Claims have gone through 
significant changes. While this Article focuses on the obstacles in bringing
cases, regardless of the chances of winning them, it is important to also 
note that even if Palestinians overcome these barriers, it is highly unlikely 
they will prevail. Between 1992 and 2002, Palestinian plaintiffs were suc-
cessful in thirty-nine percent of the Claims adjudicated by the courts. In the 
32. Confidential Interview with NGOL9 (Mar. 14, 2016).* High-profile cases are typically those 
related to foreign nationals, and the attention given to those cases often prompts the State to settle them. 
Confidential Interview with GL8 (MOD) (Dec. 13, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL9 (Sept. 30, 
2015)*; Confidential Interview with GL7 (Jan. 3, 2016).*
33. FOIA Reports, supra note 25. According to plaintiffs’ lawyers, settlements accounted for 
ninety-nine percent of their successful Claims. Confidential Interview with PL2 (Sept. 16, 2014)*; Data 
on cases represented by PL2’s firm in the Claims, March 2015 (on file with author). One rare exception 
was PL14, who noted that most of his cases ended with a court decision. Confidential Interview with 
PL14 (Mar. 15, 2016).*
34. According to plaintiffs’ lawyers, changes in the nature of the Conflict, from a popular upris-
ing during the First Intifada, to a full-fledged armed conflict in the Second Intifada, exacerbated these 
challenges as a result of the use of fire arms by both sides. Confidential Interview with PL2 (Sept. 16, 
2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL3 (July 28, 2015).*
35. Confidential Interview with PL4 (Mar. 3, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL2 (Sept. 16, 
2014)*; Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL7 (Aug. 11, 2014).*
36. Confidential Interview with GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with GL7 
(MOD) (Jan. 3, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with GL8 (MOD) (Dec. 13, 2015) (noting the use of 
polygraph as one way to handle evidentiary gaps).*
37. Confidential Interview with GL11 (DA) (Mar. 9, 2016).*
38. Confidential Interview with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL3 
(July 28, 2015).*
39. Since the outburst of the Second Intifada, the Conflict had generally been on a path of deterio-
ration, with attacks from, and casualties on, both sides. See Michele K. Esposito, The al-Aqsa Intifada: 
Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years, 34 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 85 (2005) (giving a detailed account of the events of the Second Intifada); Johannes 
Haushofer et al., Both Sides Retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 107 PROC. OF THE NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 17927, 17927–28 (2010) (analyzing the Conflict’s escalation as a result of 
mutual retaliation).
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decade between 2002 and 2012, this percentage significantly decreased to 
only seventeen percent.40 And it dropped even further over the last several 
years.41 This dramatic decrease was closely tied to an amendment to the 
Act promulgated in 2002.
Until 2002, the Act did not include a definition of “Combat Action,” 
which exempts the State from liability. For over a decade, the Israeli legis-
lature, the Knesset, discussed adding a definition. But it failed to legis-
late,42 leaving it to courts to interpret the term.43 As Assaf Jacob explains, 
the courts’ interpretations of “Combat Action” varied and ranged from 
expansive to restrictive.44 Meanwhile, in 2000, the Second Intifada erupted, 
resulting in physical injuries and property damages to many Palestinians 
and a high volume of Claims. Due to these events, and since the Knesset 
was dissatisfied with the courts’ interpretation of “Combat Action,”45 it
renewed legislative proceedings, resulting in Amendment No. 4 (“the 2002 
Amendment”). Under the 2002 Amendment, and alongside a host of proce-
dural arrangements detailed below, the Knesset added a broad definition of 
the “Combat Action” immunity to include “any action conducted to combat 
terrorism . . . and any action whose stated aim is to prevent terrorism, hos-
tile actions, or insurrection committed in circumstances of danger to life or 
limb.”46
But the Knesset did not stop at the 2002 Amendment. It sought a more 
comprehensive way of limiting Israel’s civil liability for harm caused to 
Palestinians. In 2005, the Knesset enacted Amendment No. 7 (“the 2005 
Amendment”), which granted total immunity to the State for actions under-
taken on its behalf, even retroactively, in what is defined as a “conflict 
40. Bachar, supra note 23.
41. FOIA Reports, supra note 25; YAEL STEIN, B’TSELEM, GETTING OFF SCOTT-FREE: ISRAEL’S
REFUSAL TO COMPENSATE PALESTINIANS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY ITS SECURITY FORCES 48 (2017), 
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/201703_getting_off_scot_free_eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3HL-DPTG] (citing data showing that in recent years there are fewer Claims filed 
and less compensation paid to Palestinians by Israel). 
42. See e.g., HAMOKED: CTR. FOR THE DEF. OF THE INDIVIDUAL, ACTIVITY REPORT 2005 (2005)
(in Hebrew); HAMOKED: CTR. FOR THE DEF. OF THE INDIVIDUAL, ACTIVITY REPORT 2006 (2006) (in 
Hebrew).
43. On the legal regime under the previous version of the Act, see generally Assaf Jacob, Immuni-
ty Under Fire: State Immunity for Damage Caused by Combat Action, 33 MISHPATIM L. REV. 107
(2003) (in Hebrew); Bachar, supra note 23.
44. See Jacob, supra note 43, at 159–63. 
45. The binding precedent at the time was the interpretation given to the term “Combat Action”
by the Supreme Court in CA 5964/92 Beni Uda v. State of Israel 56(4) PD 1 (2002) (Isr.). See also
Protocols of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of Dec. 25, 2001, June 24, 2002, 
June 26, 2002 (in Hebrew).
46. Act, supra note 22, § 1; Bachar, supra note 23.
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zone.”47 The Amendment’s supporters argued that since both parties are in 
the midst of an armed conflict, each party should be responsible for its own 
damages: Israel bears the cost of damages to its citizens, and the Palestinian 
National Authority should pay for those incurred by Palestinians.48
Human rights non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) challenged 
the 2005 Amendment before the Israeli High Court of Justice (“HCJ”).49
The HCJ, in a rare decision, invalidated part of the Amendment, holding 
that it disproportionately violated the right of Palestinians to compensation 
outside the scope of “Combat Action.”50 However, as explained below, the 
policy that ensued essentially reinstated the 2005 Amendment through the 
back door by using procedural obstacles to limit Palestinians’ access to 
Israeli civil courts. While the right to bring Claims remains on the books, it 
is now almost impossible to vindicate.
III. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS BLOCKING PALESTINIANS’ CLAIMS
This section examines obstacles that curtail Palestinians’ access to Is-
rael’s civil courts and focuses on barriers that restrict access to courts ra-
ther than rules that limit the scope of Israel’s liability (e.g. through 
“Combat Action” immunity). These procedural obstacles merit special 
scrutiny precisely due to their tendency to operate “under the radar,” as 
ostensibly neutral rules.
As of 2014, according to the Civil Tort Ordinance (Liability of the 
State) (Declaration of Enemy Territory–the Gaza Strip), Gaza residents are 
47. Additionally, Article 5B provided that the State is not liable for injury sustained by an enemy 
state national. Act, supra note 22, § 5B. Article 5B survived judicial review in Adalah v. Government of 
Israel. HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 352, 378 (2006) (Isr.).
48. See Protocol of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of June 30, 2005 (in 
Hebrew). A senior MOD lawyer noted that it was not the financial burden imposed by the Claims that 
pushed the State to limit the scope of liability, but rather the sense that Israel is engaged in an armed 
conflict with the Palestinians and tort law is incompatible with military operations. Confidential Inter-
view with GL7 (MOD) (Jan. 3, 2016).* See also Confidential Interview with GL9 (IDF) (Dec. 22, 
2016) (noting the IDF “checked what is happening in other countries and we saw that in many countries 
the road [for suing] is blocked . . . so we said why not block it too?”)*; Confidential Interview with 
GL12 (MOJ) (Mar. 15, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015).* That said, 
there was opposition to the 2005 Amendment within the MOD (general counsel) and MOJ (head of 
Civil Department in the State Attorney’s Office). Opponents thought the territorial exemption was 
overly sweeping. Confidential Interview with GL13 (MOD) (July 3, 2016)*; Confidential Interview 
with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with GL3 (MOJ) (July 22, 2015).*
49. The Israeli Supreme Court has two major functions: appellate court, and High Court of 
Justice. In the latter capacity, it rules as a court of first instance in matters regarding the legality of 
decisions of State authorities. Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5748–1984, § 15(b), (c), SH No. II 10 p. 78 
(Isr.).
50. While the Court acknowledged that tort law is ill-suited for situations of combat, it did not 
accept the sweeping exemption that the State sought for combat and non-combat activities in the Terri-
tories. HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 352, 373 (2006) (Isr.).
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no longer eligible to bring Claims against the State because the Ordinance 
declares Gaza “enemy territory.” Though passed in October 2014, the Or-
dinance applies retroactively to render it effective as of July 2014.51 Yet,
even prior to this ban, significant hurdles have been placed on Palestinians’ 
Claims, which still apply to pending proceedings by Gaza plaintiffs. The 
barriers, identified based on my interview data, case law, and publicly 
available sources, are divided below into three main categories: financial, 
physical, and time/space-related.
The first barrier is financial, and involves conditioning litigation upon 
the provision of a bond that secures payment of litigation expenses to the 
State should it prevail. The default rule in Israeli civil procedure does not 
require plaintiffs to deposit a bond when initiating a civil proceeding, pre-
cisely because such a requirement might hinder plaintiffs’ access to jus-
tice.52 However, there is an exception to this rule, typically applied to 
foreign plaintiffs. Courts can order such plaintiffs to provide a bond guar-
anteeing payment of the defendant’s litigation expenses based on a poten-
tial difficulty in recovering these expenses should the defendant win.53
In the early 2000s, it became common practice to treat Palestinian 
plaintiffs as foreigners, conditioning adjudication of their civil claims upon 
deposit of a bond, especially in Claims arising from IDF activity.54 When a 
Claim is brought, the State regularly seeks an order from the court requir-
ing the plaintiffs to deposit a bond,55 arguing that the same logic that refers 
to foreigners should apply to Palestinians.56 However, Palestinians are dif-
51. 7431–2014 (2014) (Isr.). This Ordinance has recently been challenged in a lawsuit for damag-
es brought in the case of N. CC (BS) 45043-05-16 John Doe v. State of Israel (unpublished, interim 
decision June 7, 2017) (Isr.). The Be’er-Sheva District Court has yet to rule on it. 
52. DUDI SCHWARTZ ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DEVELOPMENTS, PROCESSES, AND TRENDS 112 
(2007) (in Hebrew). Cf. John A. Gliedman, Access to Federal Courts and Security for Costs and Fees,
74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953 (2000); Christopher E. Austin, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the 
Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 768, 768 (1982) (discussing the implications of filing fees and 
bonds for access to courts in the U.S.).
53. See KARAYANNI, supra note 21, at 231–41 (explaining some of the difficulties that Palestini-
ans who bring claims for damages against Israel encounter, including bonds).
54. Id.
55. This security is separate from court fees, which are mandatory and typically calculated as 
2.5% of the damages. This requires substantial funds in cases of severe injuries, which at times are 
unavailable to Palestinian plaintiffs. Confidential Interview No. 1 with PL7 (Jan. 12, 2013).* There are 
also other significant litigation costs. Respondents noted that even though most tort lawsuits require 
medical opinions, those needed for the Claims are particularly complex as they often require a ballistic 
analysis of the injury and doctors rarely give such opinions without payment. Confidential Interview 
with NGOL4 (Aug. 3, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL7 (Mar. 9, 2016)*; Confidential 
Interview with PL9 (Sept. 30, 2015)*; Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL6 (Aug. 12, 2014).*
56. The State also argues that when there are several plaintiffs, each should deposit a separate 
security, and courts adhere to this approach. See, e.g., CC (Nz) 35192-08-10 Estate of Samur v. State of 
Israel (unpublished, Sept. 26, 2011) (Isr.).
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ferent from other foreign plaintiffs, both because they are not allowed to 
bring Claims against Israel before Palestinian courts,57 and because their 
personal economic ability is often quite limited.58 Palestinians’ low stand-
ard of living59 is typically overlooked by the courts, which have set bond 
amounts at increasingly high rates in recent years.60 Per one District Attor-
ney’s Office (“DA”) lawyer, the average bond is 20,000 NIS (approximate-
ly $5200) per plaintiff.61 Yet, there are cases in which the bonds were set at 
even higher amounts. In Abu Halima, for example, the overall bond was set 
at 1.2 million NIS (approximately $400,000). Attempts to appeal this 
amount were unsuccessful.62
When plaintiffs fail to deposit a bond, the Claim is suspended or dis-
missed.63 According to government lawyers, the bonds allow the State to 
“filter” Claims and make sure only “serious” cases reach the merits; in 
other words, the bonds represent a “put your money where your mouth is”
mantra.64 As a retired government lawyer observed, “X [government law-
yer] formed a platoon of attorneys and trained them to use the tactic of 
bonds. We managed to eliminate numerous claims this way. It was an ex-
cellent filter.”65 And an MOD interviewee noted, “I don’t have an execu-
tion office in the Territories, and it is so easy to file a lawsuit and get the 
57. As stipulated in the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Article III of 
Annex IV of the Interim Agreement. Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, Isr.–Palestine Liberation Auth., Annex IV, art. III, §3, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551.
58. See KARAYANNI, supra note 21, at 235–36. The binding precedent is PCA 2146/04 State of 
Israel v. Ibrahim, 58(5) PD 865 (2004). In Ibrahim, the bond was set at 9000NIS (approximately 
$2400), yet security amounts have soared since.
59. For comparison, one survey indicates that the average monthly income of a Palestinian family 
is 1771NIS (approximately $460). See DEMOCRACY & WORKERS’ RIGHTS CTR., OVERVIEW OF 
CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN PALESTINE (2006); KARAYANNI, supra note 21, at 234 n. 81 
(citing DEMOCRACY & WORKERS’ RIGHTS CTR., supra).
60. For a review of bond amounts, see KARAYANNI, supra note 21, at 233–34. 
61. Confidential Interview with GL10 (DA) (Mar. 7, 2016).* 
62. PCA 9148/11 Abu Halima v. State of Israel (unpublished, July 5, 2012) (Isr.). Plaintiffs’
lawyers mentioned other cases—particularly those related to Operation Cast Lead—in which security 
amounts skyrocketed, leading to the dismissal of Claims due to failure to deposit the bond. Confidential 
Interview with NGOL1 (July 27, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL6 (Aug. 4, 2015).*
63. For example, in Assi v. State of Israel, the plaintiff failed to deposit a bond and requested the 
case to be dismissed without prejudice, while the State argued for dismissal with prejudice. The Court 
accepted the plaintiff’s argument but imposed litigation expenses on the plaintiff: CC (Nz) 6907/07 
Assi v. State of Israel (unpublished, Jan. 11, 2009) (Isr.); see also CC (Hi) 4527/08 Barhum v. State of 
Israel (unpublished, Oct. 5, 2009) (Isr.). For further examples, see ADALAH, ADALAH’S REPORT TO:
THE UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT 21–22 
(2015), http://www.adalah.org/uploads/Adalah-Submission-UN-COI-Gaza-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VZE6-5BU5], and Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL6 (Aug. 12, 2015).*
64. Confidential Interview with GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014)*; see also Confidential Interview 
with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015).*
65. Confidential Interview with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015).*
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State [authorities] running around. So, we said let’s demand the deposit of 
a bond, it’s a move that saves lots of headache.”66
However efficient from the State’s perspective, the bonds create a 
heavy burden on the plaintiffs’ side.67 As one plaintiffs’ lawyer noted:
I once represented 11 estates and 4 amputees injured by a military action 
in Gaza . . . . The judge decided in a preliminary hearing that a 75,000 
NIS [approximately $20,000] bond needs to be deposited. I called the 
plaintiffs and they said they were out of food in the house and started 
eating from the animal feed. Eventually the lawsuit was denied because 
they couldn’t raise the money for the bond.68
Judges’ ever-growing tendency in recent years to levy litigation ex-
penses on losing Palestinian plaintiffs raises the stakes of litigation even for 
those claimants that manage to deposit the bond, given the tangible risk of 
losing it.69 For instance, one plaintiffs’ lawyer noted a case in which an 
Israeli missile hit a Palestinian family’s living room, killing two family 
members. The State was reimbursed through the deposited bond when 
plaintiffs lost.70
A second major barrier relates to physical access. Bringing and man-
aging a Claim requires entrance to Israel, first and foremost to testify in 
66. Confidential Interview with GL7 (MOD) (Jan. 3, 2016).* See also Confidential Interview 
with GL8 (MOD) (Dec. 13, 2015).*
67. Plaintiffs’ lawyers confirmed this trend and the major barrier it constitutes for plaintiffs. As 
one noted, “[p]ractically speaking the door is closed nowadays, and when it is not formally closed, it is 
blocked by requiring the deposit of bonds in amounts reaching 50 and even 100 thousand NIS [approx-
imately $14K and $28K respectively], which no plaintiff can raise, not even with the assistance of an 
organization.” Confidential Interview with PL16 (Mar. 16, 2016).* See also Confidential Interview with 
PL13 (Mar. 16, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with PL8 (July 12, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with 
PL12 (Dec. 13, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL1 (July 14, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with 
PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that the bonds represent tremendous, unattainable amounts for Palestini-
ans).*
68. Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL6 (Aug. 12, 2015).*
69. Confidential Interview with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014)*; Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL7 
(Aug. 11, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL1 (July 14, 2014) (noting a client who changed his 
mind about filing an appeal because of the high bond (40,000NIS) and his concern of having to pay the 
State’s litigation expenses should he lose).* While in the past plaintiffs were sometimes able to raise 
funds for bonds through Palestinian human rights organizations, such as the Palestinian Center for 
Human Rights (PCHR), through the Palestinian National Authority, or through private parties, these 
options are no longer available as amounts increase. Confidential Interview with PL8 (July 12, 2015)*; 
Confidential Interview with NGOL6 (Aug. 4, 2015)*; Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL7 (Aug. 11, 
2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL4 (Mar. 3, 2015).* 
70. Confidential Interview with PL9 (Sept. 30, 2015).* Other plaintiff-side lawyers noted a 
greater tendency to impose litigation expenses on losing plaintiffs in recent years. Confidential Inter-
view with NGOL5 (July 26, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL1 (July 14, 2014).* Data provided 
by HaMoked confirm this trend, showing that whereas in the past courts tended to avoid imposing 
litigation expenses on losing plaintiffs, they now increasingly impose such expenses, and in increasing-
ly high amounts. HAMOKED: CTR FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL (unpublished report) (on file
with author). 
852 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:3
court, but also to meet with legal counsel, undergo examinations by medi-
cal experts,71 sign documents to be filed in court, and other legal purpos-
es.72 Yet, the State conditions Palestinians’ entrance to Israel for legal 
needs upon obtaining a permit, which can be withheld for security reasons.
When it comes to West Bank plaintiffs, the burden stems mostly from 
the significant time and resources required to obtain a permit through the 
District Coordination and Liaison in the Territories.73 Changing rules and 
hours of operation,74 long wait times,75 requirements for additional docu-
ments,76 and degrading treatment by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints all 
complicate the bureaucratic process.77 Moreover, the State sometimes re-
quires that security guards accompany plaintiffs or their witnesses when 
traveling from the Territories to the Israeli court, yet litigants are expected 
to incur the costs of hiring a private security company themselves.78 Fur-
thermore, the State seems to be in a conflict of interests when handling 
entry requests, given that denying entry adversely affects lawsuits brought 
against it. Since State authorities hold both the (often confidential) infor-
mation on which authorities base their security prevention decisions and 
the discretion to decide who gets to enter, there exists a risk of selectively 
using that information.79 While one can challenge the State’s decision in a 
71. By plaintiff-side, State-side or court-appointed experts. Confidential Interview with NGOL4 
(Aug. 3, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL16 (Mar. 16, 2016).*
72. Plaintiff-side witnesses need to enter Israel to testify before the court too. Confidential Inter-
view with PL15 (Mar. 9, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with PL9 (Sept. 30, 2015).*
73. Confidential Interview with NGOL9 (Mar. 14, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with PL2 
(Sept. 16, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL4 (Aug. 3, 2014) (mentioning physical access as 
the main obstacle for bringing Claims).* As of October 2014, entrance to Israel for West Bank plaintiffs 
is governed by a procedure published by Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories 
(“COGAT”). Per the procedure, entry permits are granted for legal needs and are not automatically 
denied for security reasons but rather referred to “individual diagnosis.” See COGAT, PROCEDURE FOR 
CONSIDERING APPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL NEEDS, CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA 
(2014),
http://www.cogat.mod.gov.il/he/services/Procedure/????%20?????%20??????%20??????%20
???????.pdf. [https://perma.cc/T7UX-CRQ8] (in Hebrew).
74. Confidential Interview with KS2 (Mar. 15, 2016).*
75. Confidential Interview with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014).*
76. Confidential Interview with PL8 (July 12, 2015).*
77. Confidential Interview with PL4 (Mar. 3, 2015) (noting the tangible risk of losing the case 
just because the plaintiff could not attend the hearing)*; Confidential Interview with PL2 (Sept. 16, 
2014).*
78. This is subject to the discretion of the Israeli Civil Administration in the Territories. Confi-
dential Interview with PL2 (Sept. 16, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with KS2 (Mar. 15, 2016).* The 
costs of hiring a security company can reach 5000NIS (approximately $1300). Confidential Interview 
with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014).* For a recent example, see Amira Hess, The State Compensated a Palestini-
an Photographer for Soldiers’ Violence, HA’ARETZ (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2540778 [https://perma.cc/Y7NN-5MVF].
79. One plaintiffs’ lawyer mentioned that his client was treated in a Jerusalem hospital for months 
following a severe head injury caused by IDF, yet when a civil action was launched against IDF due to 
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petition before an administrative court, this is yet another lengthy process.80
Petitioners also have slim chances of succeeding, as judges are often too 
risk-averse to reverse the State’s determination of security prevention.81
Notwithstanding the serious physical access difficulties for West Bank 
plaintiffs, Gaza plaintiffs face nearly insurmountable challenges in this 
context. Since 2007, Israel has blocked its border crossings with Gaza. As 
part of the enforcement of the blockade, Israel prevents the entry of Israelis 
into Gaza, and likewise, the entry of Gaza residents into Israel, with the 
narrowly-understood exception of matters of humanitarian urgency.82 As a 
result of this policy, requests for Gaza residents’ entrance to Israel for legal 
needs are routinely denied, preventing Gaza plaintiffs from participating in 
their civil proceedings.83 NGOs challenged this policy twice before the 
HCJ in 2010 and in 2012.84 While these challenges yielded a procedure 
aimed at allowing Gaza plaintiffs to enter Israel for legal needs,85 in actual-
ity, little has changed. The procedure requires plaintiffs to prove to Israeli 
authorities not only the existence of a legal proceeding, but also that deny-
ing their request may adversely affect the proceeding and that exceptional 
humanitarian circumstances apply. Among other documents, a statement 
the injury, the State argued that there are security reasons to deny entry. Confidential Interview with 
PL10 (Dec. 14, 2015).* Other respondents shared similar stories. Confidential Interview with KS2 
(Mar. 15, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL6 (Aug. 4, 2015).*
80. One respondent noted such a petition is still pending after three years. Confidential Interview 
with KS3 (Mar. 10, 2016).* See also Confidential Interview with PL12 (Dec. 13, 2016)*; Confidential 
Interview with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014).*
81. Confidential Interview with PL11 (Dec. 16, 2015).* 
82. For Israel’s policy regarding Israel–Gaza crossing, see OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN, COGAT,
http://www.hamoked.org.il/files/2012/115400(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/TW63-EVXX] (in Hebrew); 
COGAT, UNCLASSIFIED STATUS OF PALESTINIANS’ AUTHORIZATIONS OF ENTRY INTO ISRAEL, THEIR 
PASSAGE BETWEEN JUDEA AND SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP AND THEIR TRAVEL ABROAD, (2016), 
translated in Procedures and Protocols, GISHA,
www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/procedures/general/50en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AYD-
R6ZG]. 
83. Likewise, this policy prevents Israeli lawyers who represent Gaza residents from entering 
Gaza, and prevents Gaza witnesses from entering Israel to testify.
84. HCJ 9408/10 Palestinian Center for Human Rights Ltd. v. Attorney General of Israel (2013) 
(Isr.) This case dealt with the State’s practice of raising a statute of limitations argument in Claims 
brought by Gaza plaintiffs. The petition was dismissed but the HCJ instructed the Attorney General to 
ensure “procedural fairness” for Gaza plaintiffs.); HCJ 7042/12 Abu Daka v. Ministry of Interior (2014) 
(Isr.) This case dealt with the policy of allowing entrance for Gaza residents only in urgent humanitari-
an matters. The HCJ acknowledged Gaza residents’ right to sue for damages in Israel, and the conflict 
resulting from the State—as a defendant—deciding who gets to enter, but decided not to interfere with 
the State’s policy for the time being.
85. See COGAT, PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING GAZA RESIDENTS’ APPLICATIONS FOR ENTRY 
PERMITS FOR REASONS RELATING TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN ISRAEL (2013), translated in Procedures 
and Protocols, GISHA,
http://gisha.org/userfiles/file/LegalDocuments/procedures/entering_and_exiting_gaza/44en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VFY-CJGM]. 
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regarding the plaintiff’s financial status needs to support the application.86
These burdensome requirements are manifested in the fact that, as of Feb-
ruary 2016, only nine out of fifty-seven (sixteen percent) applications filed 
under the new procedure were successful.87
Alongside denying entrance, the State is reluctant to consider alterna-
tive solutions which would allow Gaza plaintiffs to manage their Claims. 
For instance, the State is unwilling to allow Gaza witnesses to testify via 
video conference,88 and insists on original power-of-attorney documents in 
Claims by Gaza plaintiffs.89 Courts adhere to this position, suggesting 
plaintiffs should meet with counsel on neutral territory like Cyprus.90 The 
consequences of these hurdles range from hindering plaintiffs’ ability to 
follow through with a Claim,91 to cases dragging on for years, to court 
86. Confidential Interview with PL8 (July 12, 2015).* See also the petitioners’ arguments in the 
Abu Daka case, supra note 84.
87. Applications at times refer to several plaintiffs jointly. Also, at least two of these applications 
referred to other legal proceedings that are not Claims-related (in thirty applications, the type of legal 
proceeding in question was not mentioned; fourteen requested entrance for meetings with counsel). See
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN, COGAT (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/freedomOfInformation_4_9_14/answer_24_11_14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XPP6-GA9G] (in Hebrew) (data provided by COGAT in response to Gisha FOIA 
queries); OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN, COGAT (Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with author) (data provided by 
COGAT in response to Gisha FOIA queries); OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN, COGAT (Sept. 30, 2015) 
(on file with author) (data provided by COGAT in response to Gisha FOIA queries). 
88. PCA (Nz) 35950-04-11 Ministry of Defense v. Farage (2011) (Isr.) The Nazareth district 
court granted the State’s appeal on a magistrate court’s decision to allow Gaza witnesses to testify via 
video conference, holding that such an arrangement would not guarantee a proper trial. 
89. Confidential Interview with GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014) (noting that government lawyers 
purposefully demand an original power-of-attorney (“PoA”) because they know it is difficult to obtain, 
especially for Gaza plaintiffs).*
90. Confidential Interview with PL8 (July 12, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL10 
(July 6, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL3 (June 29, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with 
GL10 (DA) (Mar. 7, 2016) (noting that the State insists on original PoAs to confirm the identity of 
those behind the Claims).* In a recent case, Gaza plaintiffs, represented by Gisha, filed an administra-
tive petition against COGAT to allow them to meet with their attorney at Erez Crossing (the main 
crossing point between Gaza and Israel) to sign PoA documents. Following the Be’er-Sheva District 
judge’s comments at the hearing, COGAT agreed to allow six members of the Gaza family to meet with 
their Israeli lawyers at Erez Crossing. See AdminC (BS) 56769-07-15 Abu Said v. COGAT (un-
published, Sept. 16, 2015) (Isr.). For more on the Abu Said case, see With Gisha’s Assistance, Five 
Family Members from Gaza Manage to Meet their Israeli Lawyer at Erez Crossing for the Purpose of 
Engaging in Legal Proceedings in Israel, GISHA, http://gisha.org/legal/4723 [https://perma.cc/P6AV-
PMLE].
91. For example, in Badrasawi, a Claim was filed due to the death of a seventeen-month-old who 
climbed onto the roof of his home in Khan-Yunis, and was fatally wounded by a shot allegedly fired by 
IDF. The boy’s family filed a petition to allow the boy’s father to enter Israel to testify, which the 
administrative court eventually granted with the State’s consent. AdminC (BS) 11636/06/11 Badrasawi
v. Ministry of Defense (2012) (Isr.). Other witnesses’ entrance was left pending the State’s approval. 
See Inquiry into the Shooting Death of a Toddler in Khan Yunis: The Case of MA, HAMOKED: CTR. FOR 
THE DEFENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, http://www.hamoked.org/Case.aspx?cID=Cases0055 
[https://perma.cc/4U8G-T4F9]. In some Gaza Claims, parties reach a procedural agreement that allows 
courts to decide the case based on written materials, which also hinders plaintiffs’ ability to prove their 
case. Such an arrangement was reached, for example, in Alhadi v. State of Israel, but the Claim was 
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judgments dismissing Claims.92 Dismissal can be due to a plaintiff’s failure 
to produce evidence93 or the running of an applicable statute of limita-
tions.94
The third barrier category relates to time and space restrictions that 
apply only to Palestinians’ Claims.95 As for time, starting in 2002, the stat-
ute of limitations period on Claims was reduced from the regular seven 
years to only two years.96 This provision prioritizes the State’s interest in 
overcoming evidentiary challenges over a plaintiff’s interest in recourse.97
Plaintiffs’ lawyers noted the difficulty of putting together a case in the tight 
timeframe imposed by the short limitations period, especially given the 
delay in seeking legal counsel following an injury or the loss of a family 
member.98 Furthermore, the shortened limitations period created a backlog 
of cases that needed to be filed immediately, causing an impossible work-
load for plaintiff-side lawyers.99 Courts have been unwilling to relax the 
confines of the limitations period, even when faced with tragic circum-
stances.100
eventually dismissed without prejudice. CC (TA) 51179/04 Alhadi v. State of Israel (unpublished, Sept. 
2, 2013) (Isr.); see also Confidential Interview with NGOL4 (Aug. 3, 2014) (noting the difficulty to 
weigh a written testimony, especially by a non-Hebrew speaker).*
92. Confidential Interview with PL8 (July 12, 2015) (describing the constant struggle of PoA 
signing, permit applications and extension requests)*; Confidential Interview with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014) 
(mentioning the impact of physical access on dragging of proceedings).*
93. See, e.g., CC (Nz) 5175/04 Abu-Susein v. State of Israel (2010) (Isr.) (case dismissed due to 
difficulties in summoning the plaintiff’s witnesses); CC (Hi) 1325/98 Ramadan v. Military Commander 
in Judea & Samaria (2010) (Isr.) (case dismissed due to “Combat Action” immunity after extending for 
over a decade). For numerous other examples, see petition filed in HCJ 7042/12 Abu Daka v. Ministry 
of Interior, supra note 84 (on file with author).
94. Confidential Interview with NGOL4 (Aug. 3, 2014)*; Confidential Interview No. 2 with PL6 
(Aug. 12, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL4 (Mar. 3, 2015).* For examples of such cases, see
CC (BS) 22786-12-11 Ajarmi v. State of Israel (2013) (Isr.); CA (Jer) 25571-05-11 State of Israel v. 
Hatib (2012) (Isr.) (latter case was first dismissed because of the Gaza plaintiff’s inability to enter 
Israel, and then for the second time because at the date of that filing, the statute of limitations period 
had run). 
95. Given the limited scope of the Article, these are merely examples of key limitations.
96. Act, supra note 22, § 5A(3) (“The court shall not hear a claim filed more than two years from 
the day of the act that is the subject of the claim . . . .”).
97. As explained by GLs: Confidential Interview with GL2 (DA) (Aug. 6, 2014)*; Confidential 
Interview with GL6 (MOD) (Mar. 1, 2015).*
98. Confidential Interview with PL12 (Dec. 13, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL11 (Dec. 
16, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL15 (Mar. 9, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with PL5 (Aug. 
14, 2014).*
99. As a result, the only human rights organization taking Claims—HaMoked—began outsourc-
ing them to plaintiffs’ lawyers. Confidential Interview with KS3 (Mar. 10, 2016)*; Confidential Inter-
view with NGOL4 (Aug. 3, 2014).*
100. In Estate of Taleb v. State of Israel, filed due to the death of a Gaza resident by an Israeli 
aircraft in June 2006, the Claim was dismissed as the statute of limitations period had run, even though 
plaintiffs originally filed the Claim before the period had passed and were advised by the court to 
withdraw and re-submit. CA (TA) 2667/08 Estate of Taleb v. State of Israel (2010) (Isr.); see also CA
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Another requirement is submitting a written notice101 to the Israeli au-
thorities within sixty days of the incident that caused the injury.102 Claim-
ants unaware of this requirement may easily miss the sixty-day deadline in 
the turmoil following the incident.103 Yet, both the State and the courts 
have been unsympathetic to such cases.104 Moreover, this requirement 
binds claimants to a description of the circumstances that led to their inju-
ry,105 which may not yet be fully known to them at the time of filing the 
notice. It also allows MOD officials to ask claimants follow-up questions 
regarding the content of their notice at this initial stage, before launching an 
official proceeding.106
More recently, the Israeli legislature added a space, or geographic,
limitation on Palestinians’ Claims. As of 2012, Claims are adjudicated only 
in the courts of the Jerusalem and Southern districts.107 While this Amend-
ment was justified by citing efficiency and the need for judges’ specializa-
tion,108 the motivation behind it seems to have been that courts in other 
parts of Israel, particularly in the Nazareth and Haifa districts, were known 
5250/08 Hashan v. State of Israel (2014) (Isr.) (in which a majority of Supreme Court justices embodies 
this strict approach). 
101. As set forth in the Act, supra note 22, § 5A(2)(a) (requiring written notice of damages).
102. Additionally, the 2002 Amendment stated that rules which shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant––when the object that caused the injury was dangerous or when there exists factual vague-
ness regarding the events leading to the tort—will not apply to the Claims. Tort Ordinance (New Ver-
sion), 5729-1968 §§ 38, 41 (1968) (as amended) (Isr.), translated in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG. LEX, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=345894#a8 [https://perma.cc/YQ8N-
N6MZ]; Act, supra note 22, § 5A(4) (2002). 
103. Confidential Interview with KS2 (Mar. 15, 2016)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL6 
(Aug. 4, 2015).* 
104. Courts have strictly enforced this requirement, even in the face of parents who had lost their 
child. See CC (Magistrate Court, Kiryat Gat) 208/07 Estate of Sana v. State of Israel (2010) (Isr.); see
also CC (Magistrate Court, Hadera) 8157-08-08 Abu-Elhassan v. State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (dismiss-
ing a case due to a late notice). 
105. The notice form can be found on the Ministry of Defense website in Hebrew: 
http://www.mod.gov.il/Citizen_Service/clalim/nezikin/Pages/claims.aspx [https://perma.cc/H6FM-
7AE3]. According to the Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Regulations (Written Notice of Damage), 
5763-2003, § 1, (2003) (Isr.), translated in HAMOKED: CTR. FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL,
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2012/312_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVW6-QRRQ], the form should 
also be available in Arabic, but this version could not be found on the Ministry of Defense website. 
106. Confidential Interview with PL4 (Mar. 3, 2015).*
107. Amendment (No. 8) also requires courts to decide on “Combat Action” immunity as a prelim-
inary plea and expands the exemption of Article 5B to apply to residents of enemy territory (which now 
includes Gaza). Act, supra note 22, § 5B.
108. See HAMOKED: CTR. FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, MEMORANDUM OF THE CIVIL 
TORTS LAW (LIABILITY OF THE STATE) (AMENDMENT NO.8), 5767-2007 POSITION PAPER 7–9 (2007), 
http://www.hamoked.org/items/9081_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTX6-L8ZW]. Yet, this limitation also 
restricts the range of judicial viewpoints, confining it to the few judges adjudicating Claims in designat-
ed courts. Confidential Interview with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL4 (Mar. 3, 
2015).*
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to be more sympathetic towards Palestinian plaintiffs.109 As one DA lawyer 
mentioned, government lawyers nicknamed the Haifa courts after a terrorist 
organization due to this sympathy.110 Per that lawyer, amassing Claims in 
designated courts was an “amazing” development.111
An important consequence of these hurdles is the reluctance of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers to accept representation in Claims due to the slim chances of 
successfully overcoming these difficulties.112 Even when claimants find 
counsel, it is extremely difficult to maintain a lawyer-client relationship 
under entry barriers precluding face-to-face meetings and the gathering of 
on-the-ground evidence.113 This is yet another hindrance on Palestinians’ 
access to civil justice.114 The impact of these restrictions is also evident in 
the dramatic decrease in the volume of settlements, as procedural hurdles 
now help DA lawyers win cases without having to settle.115
The data show that the State’s efforts to restrict Palestinians’ Claims, 
both through procedural means and through the “Combat Action” immuni-
ty, bore fruit. In recent years, the number of Claims have steadily de-
clined.116 As one DA lawyer noted, “During Operation Cast Lead I had 
shelves full of cases, and nowadays it’s maybe three . . . . Most of the Cast 
Lead claims never reached the merits, due to failure to deposit a bond or 
109. Confidential Interview with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015) (noting that plaintiffs often preferred 
to bring claims in the northern courts because there were Arab judges there).* Same with plaintiff-side 
lawyers. Confidential Interview with PL9 (Sept. 30, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL11 (Dec. 
16, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL3 (June 29, 2015).* This assertion is also supported by a 
quantitative content analysis of court decisions in the Claims, showing more Claims were successful in 
the Haifa and Nazareth courts (on file with author).
110. Confidential Interview with GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014).*
111. Id.
112. Confidential Interview No. 1 with PL6 (Dec. 17, 2012)*; Confidential Interview with PL12 
(Dec. 13, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL10 (Dec. 14, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with 
NGOL6 (Aug. 4, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with PL2 (Sept. 16, 2014)*; Confidential Interview 
with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014).* This problem is exacerbated because currently there are no lawyers bring-
ing Claims on a non-profit/ pro bono basis. For more on lawyers in the Claims, see generally Gilat J. 
Bachar, When Lawyers Go to War: A Study of Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Social Justice Tort Litigation
(Sept. 2017) [hereinafter Bachar, When Lawyers Go to War] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author).
113. Confidential Interview with PL9 (Sept. 30, 2015)*; Confidential Interview with NGOL4 
(Aug. 3, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL14 (Mar. 15, 2016)*; Confidential Interview No. 2 with 
PL6 (Aug. 12, 2014). The latter jokingly added that it is sometimes easier to only be able to converse 
with clients via phone; this way he does not need to look into their eyes when sharing constant bad 
news.*
114. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 
ANN. REV. SOC. 339, 344 (2008) (reviewing top-down access to justice research which looks at the 
availability of legal counsel as a measure). 
115. FOIA Reports, supra note 25; Bachar, When Lawyers Go to War, supra note 112, at 13–14.
116. The data also show a decline in the number of successful Claims. FOIA Reports, supra note 
25; STEIN, supra note 41, at 48.
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submit an appropriate PoA or because of Combat Action.”117 And another 
government lawyer summarized:
The number of claims dramatically declined, nowadays it’s several doz-
ens versus thousands in the past. Our determination in the war against 
these cases paid off . . . . The insight was that if we would be determined 
and fight with full force—without paying anything—at some point the 
other side will realize that it doesn’t pay off to bring these cases.118
With this in mind, I now turn to explore the nature of the deprivation 
caused to Palestinians as a result of the abovementioned procedural re-
strictions.
IV. PALESTINIANS’ ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE – BETWEEN 
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE
How should we think about the harm to Palestinians resulting from 
imposing procedural hurdles in their path to bring civil claims? In what 
sense has the State, by creating these hurdles, curtailed Palestinians’ access 
to justice? And what are the consequences of this curtailment? To concep-
tualize the precise harm caused to injured Palestinians, in this Section I 
decompose the right to access to civil justice to its various parts.
A. Procedure as Means of Restricting Access to Civil Justice
Access to justice has long been recognized as a fundamental human 
right.119 It has been viewed to include the procedural capacity to turn to the 
courts to gain a fair trial, which would result in a remedy. A violation of 
each of these three components would constitute an infringement on the 
right.120 Whereas the right to access to justice can be explained in terms of 
117. Confidential Interview with GL10 (DA) (Mar. 7, 2016) (emphasis added).*
118. Confidential Interview with GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014) (emphasis added).* One DA lawyer 
expressed a different view, noting he still believes that “the existing opening is wide enough to allow 
people that view themselves–and I emphasize view themselves–as injured and also wide enough for us 
as representatives of the State to allow them to exhaust their rights with dignity and honor.” Confiden-
tial Interview with GL11 (DA) (Mar. 9, 2016).* Considering the data, though, it is hard not to view this 
statement as the result of self-serving bias.
119. After World War II, access to justice rights gained international recognition and since became 
a basic concept in the law of procedure. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 237–38 (1989). For major works on the right to access to justice, see 
generally ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004); ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE (Mauro Cappel-
letti ed., 1981); Liav Orgad & Yoram Rabin, Access to Courts for Enemy Aliens, 29 MECHKAREI 
MISHPAT 469, 472–74 (2014) (in Hebrew). 
120. Aharon Barak, The Right to Access the Judicial System, in SHLOMO LEVIN BOOK 31, 32 
(Grunis et al. eds., 2013) (in Hebrew). Relatedly, a well-known legal maxim holds that “[t]he law 
will . . . presume no wrong where is has provided no remedy.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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the judiciary’s ability to fulfill its function as a branch of government,121 I
focus in this Article on the function this right serves for individuals exercis-
ing it.
How can “procedural,” as opposed to “substantive,” rules preclude in-
dividuals from vindicating their right to access to justice? Challenging the 
traditional view that procedure is no more than a neutral mechanism for 
judicial administration, scholars have shown that, much like substantive 
law, procedure is value- and purpose-based and has a far-reaching influ-
ence on substantive rights. Its impact is brought to bear both as a mecha-
nism for guiding human behavior and as a way to shape the scope of, and 
the ability to vindicate, substantive rights.122 Legal requirements, such as 
jurisdictional limitations and burdens of proof, tend to operate under a veil 
of neutrality. However, they end up playing an increasingly prominent role 
in policing entrance to the legal space, reflecting “cultural values and con-
solidations of power.”123 In particular, intricate legal tools can serve as 
instruments in defining and altering laws that apply to the rights of vulner-
able groups like minorities and natives.124 As Alexandre Kedar notes, 
“[p]rocedural rules and obstacles, such as time limits, and questions of 
jurisdiction and standing . . . have the effect of dispossessing indigenous 
populations without even admitting the dispossession.”125
COMMENTARIES *246, n.5. However, courts do not always adhere to this rule. See, e.g., Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). 
121. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to 
Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172 (1973); John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil 
Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 597 (1984); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1785, 1799 (2001).
122. See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Procedure and Substance: A Fresh Look at Old Categories, in
LAW, SOCIETY AND CULTURE: PROCEDURES 45 (Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi eds., 2014) (in 
Hebrew) (suggesting that instead of focusing on the distinction between procedure and substance, the 
focus should be on a value-based, case-by-case discussion regarding the substantive rights at stake).
123. Melinda Harm Benson, Rules of Engagement: The Spatiality of Judicial Review, in THE 
EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 215, 216 (I. Braverman et al. eds., 2014). 
124. See Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler States: Notes 
Towards a Research Agenda, 5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 401, 415–16 (2003) (explaining the use of 
procedure to dispossess indigenous peoples in ethnocratic settler states); Ilan Saban, The Legal Status of 
Minorities in Deeply Divided Societies: The Arab Minority in Israel and the Francophone Minority in 
Canada (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (in Hebrew) (review-
ing legal and administrative techniques used in the context of the Arab minority in Israel).
125. Kedar, supra note 124, at 415–16; see also Martha Minow, Politics and Procedure, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 79 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (explaining the use of 
injunctions in altering the course of the labor movement in the U.S.); Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, 
Editorial Introduction, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 1, 12 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994) 
(“[C]onventions and rules enable, and, at the same time, constrain the opportunities for voice. This is, 
for example, the case with respect to the rules of evidence.”); Guadelupe T. Luna, On the Complexities 
of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 706 
(1999) (describing the mechanism that enabled the dispossession of Chicanos in the Southwest, arguing 
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The host of procedural hurdles described above point to a systematic 
“discouragement” policy on the part of the State, aimed at reducing the 
volume of Claims brought against it.126 This discouragement policy differs 
from other policies launched in the United States, such as the tort reform 
movement. As explained below, while we may identify corporate interests 
supporting the policy—namely saving money for the State, these interests 
do not fully explain the motivation behind the policy. Rather, it seems to 
have been driven by the notion that since Palestinians are the enemy, they 
should not be given a right to sue before Israeli courts. In other words, the 
policy represents disparate treatment towards a specific class of plaintiffs.
Though the State failed to transform the Claims mechanism through a 
comprehensive legislative change—i.e., the invalidated 2005 Amend-
ment—it continued to pursue its goals through the procedural limitations 
described above. According to one DA lawyer, the public treasury was 
actually better off because of the 2005 Amendment’s invalidation, as so 
few cases are now successfully brought.127 The fact that the change is car-
ried out through procedural tools also obviates another legislative battle. As 
another government lawyer noted, “In principle, the right to access the 
courts does not change. Fine . . . . I don’t think there is room to change the 
law.”128 And as a government lawyer involved in advancing the restrictive 
policy mentioned: “We needed to draw the courts’ attention to the changes, 
to teach them, and it worked well. I think it has been years now since the 
last case of this type was brought . . . .”129
The policy of prescribing special procedural arrangements for the 
Claims creates a gap between the existence of the Claims mechanism on 
the books and the actual lack of access. This gap simultaneously raises 
plaintiffs’ expectations and fails to meet them. As Alexandra Lahav puts it, 
substantive rights whose vindication is denied through procedure “remind 
that “a number of arbitrary key rulings varied the standard of proof in claims of ownership status de-
pending on whether the grantee was a non-Chicana/o”).
126. The process of restricting Palestinians’ ability to successfully bring tort claims is akin to what 
Thomas Burke dubs discouragement policies; policies that aim to restrict or discourage litigation by 
making it harder or less rewarding to bring lawsuits (for instance, capping the amount of money a 
plaintiff can win for pain-and-suffering damages). These policies do not stop litigation altogether but
can reduce the volume and intensity of claims to become negligible. Discouragement campaigns, 
particularly the tort reform movement, have become the most prominent of all anti-litigation efforts in 
the U.S. See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 9–18 (2002). 
127. He added that “[t]he procedural tools were the most meaningful.” Confidential Interview with 
GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014).*
128. Confidential Interview with GL7 (MOD) (Jan. 3, 2016).* A similar approach was articulated 
by another government lawyer. Confidential Interview with GL6 (MOD) (Mar. 1, 2015).*
129. Confidential Interview with GL12 (MOJ) (Mar. 15, 2016).* 
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one of old facades preserved along a streetscape, the buildings for which 
they were once an entrance having long ago been abandoned.”130 Plaintiff-
side lawyers observed this frustrating duality of having a right to sue on 
paper while facing overwhelming hurdles that block Claims in practice.131
As one lawyer mentioned: “Nowadays there is barely a single case that can 
cross these hurdles. In practice, we reach the same result as the [2005] 
amendment . . . . It is kind of a mantle of ‘T’fadalu [go ahead, Arabic], 
bring a lawsuit, see where that gets you.’”132
As we have seen, courts generally avoid criticizing the State for its use 
of procedure against Palestinians who bring Claims. In this sense, the 
courts allow these procedural hurdles to restrict Palestinians’ access to civil 
justice vis-à-vis the State.133 I thus argue that the State’s use of procedural 
barriers to restrict injured Palestinians’ Claims infringes on their right to 
access to justice. Importantly, this analysis is not intended to downplay 
Palestinians’ primary injuries, i.e. bodily injuries or property damages. It 
simply highlights a different aspect of the harm, which results from restrict-
ing the right to turn to the courts following such losses. I offer two lenses to 
conceptualize this harm. First, a property-centered approach of a “dignity 
taking,” and second, a process-centered approach of the denial of the litiga-
tion process. While these approaches are not mutually exclusive, I argue 
that using only the former lens but not the latter would give an inevitably 
incomplete picture of the full extent of the harms.
B. Restricting Access to Civil Justice as a “Dignity Taking”
Per Bernadette Atuahene’s revised definition, a dignity taking in-
volves involuntary property loss accompanied by dehumanization or infan-
tilization.134 Following John Locke, Atuahene highlights the deep-seated 
consequences of state sanctioned property confiscation, tying the taking of 
property under certain circumstances with a grave dignitary harm.135 Digni-
ty takings have mostly been associated with narrowly defined events—such 
130. Lahav, supra note 6, at 1701.
131. Confidential Interview with NGOL1 (July 27, 2014)*; Confidential Interview with PL16 
(Mar. 16, 2016) (noting the discrimination between Israeli and Palestinian plaintiffs in the application 
of the law of torts).*
132. Confidential Interview with PL5 (Aug. 14, 2014).*
133. See Carol M. Rose, Racially Restrictive Covenants—Were They Dignity Takings?, 41 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 939, 948 (2016) (arguing that public bodies—both courts and agencies—participated in 
making racially restrictive covenants so pervasive in the mid-twentieth century).
134. Atuahene, supra note 12, at 796, 804. Dignity Restoration merits its own discussion, which 
exceeds the scope of this Article.
135. Id. at 799.
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as the Rwandan genocide—and have not yet been expanded to broader 
contexts.136 Does restricting access to justice constitute a taking of proper-
ty? Does it involve an affront, adding insult to injury? I argue below that an 
individual’s right to compensation accorded by the law of torts can be un-
derstood as both a property right and an attribute of human dignity. As I 
explain, Israeli case law has used a similar construct to afford the right of 
access to justice a constitutional status, even though Israel lacks a formal 
constitution.137
1. Property Taking
Tort liability protects several rights of the injured party, such as the 
right to life, liberty, dignity, and privacy. The law of torts is one of the 
main tools whereby the legal system protects these rights, reflecting a bal-
ance both between private rights themselves and between the right of the 
individual and the public interest.138 Therefore, the accepted approach in 
most countries where property is given a constitutional status has been that 
the constitutional concept of property includes both a right in rem and a 
right in personam.139 In Israel, Article 3 to Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty (“the Basic Law”)—“a person’s property should not be harmed”—
has been understood to extend to a person’s property rights, including the 
right of an injured party under the law of torts.140 Moreover, the Basic Law 
encompasses injured individuals’ right to compensation, intended to “make 
them whole,” as part of these individuals’ property rights.141 Chief Justice 
Barak’s holding in Adalah, that the right in torts given to injured parties (or 
their heirs or dependents) is part of their right to property, reflects this un-
derstanding.142 As a result, preventing vindication of this right may well be 
considered a taking of property.143
136. See infra Section B.2.
137. See KARAYANNI, supra note 21, at 229–30.
138. See IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 125–34 (1993) (in Hebrew); IZHAK 
ENGLARD, COMPENSATION FOR ROAD ACCIDENT VICTIMS 9 (3d ed. 2005) (in Hebrew).
139. Yehoshua Weisman, Constitutional Protection of Property, 42 HA’PRAKLIT 258, 266–67 
(1995) (in Hebrew); A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 21 (1999); John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 524, 561 (2005).
140. 5752–1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.), http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawLiberty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ED3-FLE3]; see CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative 
Village 49(4) PD 221, 494 (1995) (Isr.); HCJ 7957/04 Mara’be v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 
477 (2005) (citing HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Local Council v. Knesset 59(2) PD 1 (2005) (Isr.)). 
141. ELIEZER RIVLIN, THE ROAD ACCIDENT—APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW, PROCEDURE AND 
CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 911 (4th ed. 2011) (in Hebrew); see also HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Govern-
ment of Israel 62(1) PD 352, 374 (2006) (Isr.); HCJ 2390/96 Karasik v. State of Israel 55(2) PD 625 
(2001) (Isr.). 
142. HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Government of Israel 62(1) PD 352, 373–75.
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2. Dignitary Affront
Atuahene argues that a dignity taking involves an intentional or unin-
tentional “dehumanization” or “infantilization” of the dispossessed.144 Does 
restricting Palestinians’ access to civil justice result in an affront at the 
level described by Atuahene?
My investigation focused on the intentions of the State in imposing 
procedural restrictions on Palestinians’ Claims, rather than on how the loss 
is perceived by Palestinians who suffered it. Based on the data, I did not 
find evidence for dehumanization or infantilization of Palestinians by Israe-
li government lawyers, policymakers, and legislators. Arguably, denying 
Palestinians access to civil justice may be infantilizing in and of itself—
treating them as children who would not benefit from the litigation process. 
However, I posit that such an interpretation would overly expand the scope 
of the term “infantilization” and erode the need for empirical data to make 
a case for a dignity taking.145
In contrast, I argue that the data reflect a discrimination of Palestinians 
as a group, which infringes on their dignity.146 As Atuahene notes, some 
cases fall in “the middle of the takings spectrum,” i.e. property confisca-
tions that occur due to humiliation, degradation, radical othering, unequal 
status, or discriminatory actions that do not rise to the level of dehumaniza-
tion or infantilization.147 The analysis I offer regarding the dignitary harm 
caused by the discrimination of Palestinians provides a lead towards better 
defining this “middle-of-the-spectrum” category.
The right to dignity enshrined in Israel’s Basic Law has been under-
stood to include a right not to be discriminated against, deprived, or humil-
In his concurring opinion in Adalah, Justice Grunis raised questions regarding the applicability of the 
Basic Law to events occurring in the Territories. Id. at 390, 392–93. Since the State did not provide a 
satisfactory answer to this question, he decided to join the majority. Id. at 390. 
143. Examining whether racially restrictive covenants qualify as dignity takings, Carol Rose 
argues that these covenants “did not so much take a ‘thing’ as they took an opportunity to acquire a 
thing.” Rose, supra note 133, at 950. Yet, the right in torts given to the injured party is more specific 
than an opportunity to acquire property or use land. Furthermore, I tend to agree with Kedar that the 
notion of a taking should be broadly understood, to include the opportunity to acquire property. In his 
words, “the taking of dignity should be explicated within this context, which also includes the oppor-
tunity or lack of opportunity to acquire land.” Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, Dignity Takings and Dispos-
session in Israel, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 866, 869 (2016). Therefore, unlike Rose, I conclude that in 
our case a taking of property has taken place.
144. Atuahene, supra note 12, at 800–01.
145. Id. at 811–12 (“The presence or absence of the dehumanization or infantilization that forms 
the basis of a dignity taking is most appropriately determined through empirical interrogation.”).
146. Atuahene defines “dignity” as “the notion that people have equal worth, which gives them the 
right to live as autonomous beings not under the authority of another.” Id. at 800.
147. See also Kedar, supra note 143, at 870 (suggesting that such othering may apply to a popula-
tion perceived as an enemy or a threat to security).
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iated.148 While the principle of equality itself is not embodied in the Basic 
Law, the idea that a discrimination against a group might be considered a 
violation of the human dignity has gotten traction in Israeli scholarship and 
case law. Under this approach, the Basic Law seeks to protect against hu-
miliation, and while not all violations of equality would cause humiliation, 
certain types of group discrimination would.149
The restriction of Palestinians’ access to civil justice is based on such 
group discrimination. It singles out and delegitimizes Palestinians as ene-
mies of Israel, who do not merit the same treatment as Israeli citizens. In a 
similar context, Kedar argues that the Arab minority in Israel is conceived 
as “a security threat and an impediment to the Judaization of the Land of 
Israel, but this does not necessarily require that they be perceived as child-
like or inferiors, or be referred to as animals.”150 I argue that this perception 
also applies to non-Israeli citizen Palestinians, who are even easier to frame 
as “others.” Consequently, politicians, government lawyers, and judges are 
far more prone to associating Palestinians with terrorist groups and portray-
ing them as security threats to the Israeli public.
The records documenting the restrictive policy described above and 
my interviews with the lawyers involved show that the State advanced a 
narrative which characterized Palestinians as an enemy group. Per that 
narrative, Palestinians, whether or not they actually pose a threat to Israel’s 
security, do not deserve compensation for injuries caused in the course of 
the Conflict.151 For instance, discussing one of the restrictive amendments, 
MK Yosef Lapid noted:
we are faced with a society that normatively views it as a command to lie 
to the occupying Jews and to extort the maximum amount of money 
from them . . . . This gap between the norms of Palestinian society to-
wards Israelis, towards the Israeli administration, their complete liberty 
to bring ten lying witnesses, doesn’t it justify changing the norms . . . .152
148. See Haim Cohen, The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State: Studies in Basic Law: Hu-
man Dignity and Liberty, in HA’PRAKLIT—JUBILEE BOOK 9, 32 (1993) (in Hebrew). 
149. See, e.g., the approach expressed by Justice Dorner in HCJ 4541/94 Alice Miller v. Minister 
of Defense 49(4) PD 94, 131–33 (1995) (Isr.); HCJ 4513/96 Abu-Arar v. Minister of Interior 52(4) PD 
26, 46–47 (1998) (Isr.). See also Michal Tamir (Itzhaki), The Right to Equality of Homosexuals and 
Lesbians, 45 HA’PRAKLIT 94 (2000) (in Hebrew), and Hila Keren, Equality within Contract Law: A 
Feminist Reading, 31 MISHPATIM L. REV. 269 (2000) (in Hebrew), for two papers that suggest a similar 
interpretation to the Basic Law in the context of LGBT people, and women, respectively. 
150. Kedar, supra note 143, at 883.
151. See, e.g., Confidential Interview with GL7 (MOD) (Jan. 3, 2016)*; Confidential Interview 
with GL5 (DA) (Aug. 13, 2015)*; see also supra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text for a discussion 
on the Knesset Protocols. 
152. Protocol of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of June 24, 2002 (empha-
sis added) (in Hebrew). 
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This resonates with a tendency to ignore differences between terrorist 
organizations and the rest of Palestinian society, including innocent by-
standers, in order to promote the new policy.153 The words of MK Gid’on
Sa’ar during the 2012 Amendment deliberations are illustrative; the Claims 
turn Israel into “an ATM for the terror attacks launched against the State 
and its citizens.”154
A similar narrative was used by government lawyers to justify re-
strictions imposed on Palestinian claimants, portraying the Claims as futile. 
As one government lawyer noted, “Nowadays . . . they need to deposit a 
bond so they have something to lose and so they choose their cases careful-
ly instead of overwhelming the courts with heaps of lawsuits which would 
just be denied and are only burdening the system.”155 Another government 
lawyer was even blunter about the role of the Claims: “I think tort claims 
against [Israel’s] security forces are a battering ram at the hands of the 
State of Israel in the regional struggle we are facing.”156 And a Palestinian 
human rights activist involved in bringing Claims observed: “The percep-
tion is that any Palestinian is more dangerous [than an Israeli], no matter 
what he does.”157
Based on these data, I argue that imposing procedural restrictions on 
Claims represents discrimination against Palestinians as a group.158 In this 
sense, while not a full-fledged dignity taking, the restrictions may well fall 
in the middle-of-the-spectrum category. Indeed, this category is an appeal-
ing resort considering the narrow dignity taking framing associated with 
extreme cases like Kristallnacht (“Night of Broken Glass”)159 or the Rwan-
dan genocide.160 However, this middle-ground category demands more 
153. See, e.g., the argument between then Minister of Justice Meir Shitrit and MK Taleb Alsana 
during one of the discussions regarding the 2002 Amendment. Protocol of the Knesset’s Constitution, 
Law, and Justice Committee of Dec. 25, 2001 (in Hebrew).
154. Protocol of the Knesset’s Plenum, First Reading of Amendment (No. 8), June 10, 2008 (in 
Hebrew). 
155. Confidential Interview with GL1 (DA) (Aug. 17, 2015).* Another DA lawyer echoed the 
sense that Palestinians bring Claims because they have nothing to lose. Confidential Interview with 
GL11 (DA) (Mar. 9, 2016).*
156. Confidential Interview with GL4 (DA) (Aug. 18, 2014).* It should be noted that government 
lawyers tended to resort to military language during interviews, using phrases like “joining forces,”
“platoon,” and “war of attrition” in the context of the Claims. 
157. Confidential Interview with KS2 (Mar. 15, 2016).* It has been argued that despite the HCJ’s
landmark ruling in Adalah v. Government of Israel, this portrayal of Palestinians also permeates the
Supreme Court. See Ofer Shinar Levanon, The Ethos of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as Reflected by 
the Judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court 1948–2006, at 83–86 (Sept. 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (in Hebrew) (suggesting that the Court advances a dis-
course which depicts Palestinians as potential security threats).
158. Atuahene, supra note 12, at 799.
159. See Rose, supra note 133, at 944.
160. Atuahene, supra note 12, at 799–800.
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elaborate discussion on both the dignitary harm required to meet its criteria 
and the remedy it merits. The analysis above, based on dignity and discrim-
ination in Israeli law, offered a first step towards better defining this cate-
gory.
As for remedy, Atuahene rightfully acknowledges the need to recog-
nize one’s equal human worth following a dignity taking, which cannot be 
satisfied merely through reparations.161 Nevertheless, while Atuahene notes 
that “dignity restoration can also be a remedy for involuntary property loss 
that does not involve dehumanization or infantilization,”162 she does not 
specify under which circumstances such restoration would be deemed nec-
essary. And her proposition remains contingent upon how we label the 
“taking” in question. Though the dignity taking analysis recognizes the 
injury to one’s dignity that a taking may involve, this framework inevitably 
revolves around property loss as the core deprivation. I challenge this con-
centration below.
C. Restricting Access to Civil Justice as Denial of the Litigation Pro-
cess
The analysis thus far suggests that restricting Palestinians’ access to 
civil justice infringes on their property rights, and that this infringement 
involves group discrimination. However, this analysis centers on the prop-
erty aspect of the Claims—the prospects of receiving monetary remedy for 
one’s loss. As such, it overlooks a significant aspect of the harm potentially 
caused by restricting access to civil justice: the denial of the process by
which Claims are decided. As outlined below, focusing only on the out-
come of tort litigation ignores a host of equally important purposes it 
serves.163
The traditional account of torts tended to emphasize compensation, 
viewing tort litigation as an avenue to identify and provide redress for inju-
rious wrongs committed by one individual against another.164 Over the 
years, however, other theories have considered various purposes that the 
tort system fulfills. According to civil recourse theory,165 once an individu-
al has behaved tortiously, the state empowers private parties—victims and 
161. Id. at 796.
162. Id. at 815.
163. For a review of the various objectives of tort law, see JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE 
P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 2–5 (2016).
164. John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 516–17 (2003).
165. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 754 (2003) 
(noting that the theory seeks to strengthen the explanatory power of corrective justice theory while 
retaining its notion that tort law was a matter of “private wrongs”).
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potential plaintiffs—with a right of action that they can choose to bring to 
obtain a remedy against the tortfeasor, thus entitling such victims to hold 
their tortfeasors accountable.166 Moreover, civil litigation provides partici-
pants with an official form of governmental recognition. Even if a party 
loses her case, the fact that she can assert her claim and require both a gov-
ernment official and the person who has wronged her to respond is a signif-
icant form of recognition of her dignity.167 Such recognition may be 
particularly essential for Palestinians—people under Israeli occupation 
without any forum of their own to resort to.168 An acknowledgment of their 
dignity and autonomy from those in power is of crucial importance,169 as is 
the opportunity to demand answers and to stand on equal footing with their 
state perpetrators.170
Relatedly, research has identified injured individuals’ need to receive 
a “day in court” as a mechanism to experience control over what happened 
to them.171 As Tom Tyler, E. Allan Lind and their colleagues showed, deci-
sion-making procedures, including civil litigation, not only deliver out-
comes; they also convey important information about our relationship with 
the group and its authorities.172 Individuals are especially attuned to the 
procedure’s neutrality, the trustworthiness of the third party, and signals 
that convey social standing, such as having a voice in the process.173 In-
deed, these aspects of legal proceedings build on people’s understanding of 
themselves as members of a political community, and, as such, may not 
apply to individuals that do not identify with the superordinate group. As a 
result, Palestinians may be more instrumental—namely compensation-
oriented—and less concerned with the process elements of civil litiga-
166. See generally Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1784–85 
(2007); Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 245 (2011). 
167. See Goldberg, supra note 139, at 626.
168. I refer to the lack of recourse to Palestinian civil courts, rather than international tribunals, 
which are significantly less efficient in providing civil recourse. See Gilat J. Bachar, Damages for 
Collateral Damage: Monetary Compensation for Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict 3 (Sept. 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
169. In explaining the key roles of litigation, including recognition, Lahav relies on Hannah Ar-
endt’s “right to have rights”: “the ability to assert that one is entitled to respect as a moral agent . . . a
foundational form of recognition from the state.” Lahav, supra note 6, at 1668.
170. See Jason M. Solomon, What is Civil Justice, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 336 (2010) (relating 
the civil recourse aspects of tort law to concepts of democratic equality).
171. For an excellent review, see Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-
Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 171 (2005).
172. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN 
LAW 65–88 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 236 (1988).
173. Tyler & Lind, supra note 172, at 65–88; LIND & TYLER, supra note 172, at 236. 
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tion.174 However, causality may also run the other way: instrumentalism 
can result from unfair treatment by those in power.175
An emphasis on process also characterizes theories explaining the val-
ue of tort litigation in terms of transparency, which is key in Palestinians’ 
Claims. As Alexandra Lahav notes, the litigation process can reveal infor-
mation important to the litigants involved.176 “[The process] can combine 
the facts and the law to produce narratives and explanations of past events, 
frameworks for addressing hurtful events that are ongoing, and opportuni-
ties for healing . . . .”177 And “[e]ven when these narratives are not fully 
satisfactory . . . they help participants come to terms with the past.”178 An
illustration can be found in the Rachel Corrie case.179 Rachel, an American 
human rights activist, participated in a Gaza protest in 2003. During the 
protest, under contested circumstances, Rachel was killed by an IDF bull-
dozer. In the wake of Rachel’s death, after a military investigation deter-
mined her death was an accident, Rachel’s family brought a wrongful death 
Claim against Israel. The family lost the case,180 but as they expressed in 
the conversations we had, the process was nevertheless significant for 
them.181 It allowed them to receive information about what happened to 
Rachel and hear from those perceived as responsible for her death, espe-
cially since other courses of action, such as criminal charges against the 
bulldozer driver, were blocked.182 As Sarah, Rachel’s sister, put it: “I’m 
sorry this is how things worked out but I’m not sorry we [brought the 
174. While procedural justice findings are robust across ethnicities and ideologies, “[p]eople who 
identify predominantly with a subgroup may focus on instrumental issues when evaluating a superordi-
nate-group authority, and conflicts with that authority may escalate if those people do not receive 
favorable outcomes.” Yuen J. Huo et al., Superordinate Identification, Subgroup Identification, and 
Justice Concerns: Is Separatism the Problem; Is Assimilation the Answer? 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 40 (1996); 
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE 
POLICE AND COURTS 15–16 (2002).
175. Huo et al., supra note 174, at 45. This hypothesis requires further empirical investigation. It is 
interesting to mention, though, as one way to explain the Israeli government’s approach towards the 
Claims, that people are often less concerned about justice when dealing with people who are outside of 
their own ethnic or social group. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J.
PSYCH. 117, 123 (2000).
176. Lahav, supra note 6, at 1683.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1683–84. See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 841 (2012), and Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan Ryan, Democracy, Courts and the Information Order,
54 EUR. J. SOC. 67 (2013), for other functions of court-enabled transparency.
179. CA 6982/12 Estate of Rachel Corrie v. State of Israel, Ministry of Defense (2015) (Isr.).
180. Id.
181. Confidential Interview with the Corrie Family (July 29, 2015).*
182. Id.
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Claim]. There were so many little details we learned . . . . It was almost like 
a little investigation of our own.”183
Sarah’s words underscore the severity of the harm that can result from
denying injured individuals access to civil justice, which deprives them not 
only of the right to seek monetary redress, but also of the right to the vari-
ous functions of the litigation process. These key roles of the tort process—
the opportunity to vindicate a right of action, hold tortfeasors accountable, 
receive recognition for their plea, have a voice, and produce a narrative—
were denied to Palestinians for whom access to civil justice has been 
blocked. The right to the litigation process itself, regardless of whether it 
would result in a remedy, should therefore be separate from the property 
right to compensation provided by the law of torts. A dignity taking analy-
sis fails to capture this additional deprivation, and is thus incomplete in our 
case.184 Indeed, both analyses may result in a similar conclusion—that a 
fair, just procedure should be put in place to afford recognition to injured 
individuals. However, per Atuahene, such a process will only be set in 
motion having first established that the taking involved—be it a dignity 
taking or a “middle-of-the-spectrum” taking—merits a restoration process. 
I suggest that rather than only looking at the deprivation of monetary com-
pensation as a “taking,” we should consider the denial of the litigation pro-
cess as another form of deprivation outside the dignity taking framework.
V. CONCLUSION
The systematic restriction of Palestinians’ Claims before Israeli civil 
courts, through intricate procedural rules, encroaches on their access to 
justice. One may certainly consider this restriction through the prism of a 
dignity taking. It involves infringement on injured Palestinians’ property 
rights, which include their right to compensation afforded by the law of 
torts, and an affront that stems from discriminating against Palestinians as a 
group. While the latter does not fit squarely into Atuahene’s definition, it 
may well fall into the middle-of-the-takings-spectrum, an under-theorized 
category which demands a better definition of its scope and the remedy it 
merits. Yet, a key component of the harm is overlooked by emphasizing 
only the “end game” of tort litigation: the right to compensation. As the 
theories presented in this Article explain, even when plaintiffs lose, partici-
pation in the litigation process carries value. I argued that the various func-
183. Id.
184. As Atuahene acknowledges, this framework “does not preclude the creation of other theoreti-
cal frameworks for thinking about dignity deprivations unrelated to property confiscation.” Atuahene,
supra note 12, at 821.
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tions tort litigation serves—including accountability, transparency, and 
recognition—are all the more important when it comes to plaintiffs belong-
ing to a group as vulnerable as Palestinians—people under occupation 
without institutions of their own to turn to.
We should bear in mind that the analysis presented in this Article fo-
cused primarily on state actors’ intentions in imposing the procedural re-
strictions, relying on interviews with lawyers and policymakers, as well as 
documents exhibiting legislative intent. Another central aspect to assessing 
the nature of the harm, though, is claimants’ perceptions.185 Future research 
should systematically gather accounts of Palestinians injured by IDF, who 
either filed a Claim or did not do so, to study their subjective evaluations of 
their injuries.186 Towards such future research, this Article suggests that 
when conceptualizing the restriction of access to civil justice, we must look 
beyond the taking of the property right to tort compensation. Only then will 
we see the “taking” of the right to the litigation process itself.
185. On the need for such data to establish a dignity taking, see id. at 818.
186. Future research may also use experiments to test the harm of an intentional and/or uninten-
tional denial of process and compensation of various victims. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attach-
ment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713 (2008) (suggesting, based on two experi-
ments, that subjective attachment to property is more significant than other factors in determining the 
perceived justice of an eminent domain taking).
